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Limited donations force nonprofit entrepreneurs to ration needy individuals by deciding on 
who is served at what quality level. We propose a positive model of this allocation for appli-
cants with differing incomes under the assumption of perfect user-fee discrimination. By fol-
lowing recent experimental economic research on social preferences, we assume that entre-
preneurs behave inequity averse, i.e. they care about the relative consumption possibilities of 
others. We find that less inequity-averse entrepreneurs prefer to serve wealthier individuals at 
high reference quality. In contrast, more inequity-averse entrepreneurs care for the poorest 
individuals but offer minimum quality. Furthermore, as input costs increase, entrepreneurs 
with low inequity aversion change the target group, while entrepreneurs with high aversion do 
not.
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11. Introduction 
The quality with which nonprofit organizations provide needy individuals with goods and 
services is subject to large variations, even within the same branches of the same region: The 
provision of shelter ranges from a low-quality emergency stay to a long-term accommodation 
at market standard; food is supplied on a nonprofit basis by soup kitchens as well as higher 
quality university cafeterias. The choice of quality level follows a specific pattern related to 
the income of the target group. In cases where only the ability to pay defines the neediness of 
individuals, the good or service provided to the poorest is frequently of significantly lower 
quality than comparable market offers. According to the World Bank (2003), in low- and 
middle-income countries services for poor people are often of low quality characterized by 
inadequately skilled workers, lacking resources, facilities in disrepair etc. More specifically, 
for micro-insurance schemes addressing the poor in developing countries a survey by McCord 
(2001) shows that these insurances’ coverage of health risks is very limited.
2
 Similar findings 
are reported for food assistance programs, which often supply low-quality food.
3
 From these 
observations one may question why nonprofits do not alternatively use their income from do-
nations to lift the service quality to market level at the cost of a lower quantity of recipients. 
Our interest in this paper is to provide a theoretical foundation to explain how nonprofits gen-
erally choose the quality/quantity mix of social goods and services.  
Existing explanations for the low quality of services to the very poor are limited to the 
role of governmental provision. For example, Glazer and Niskanen (1997) highlight the im-
portance of a poor majority in a public choice setting while Besley and Coate (1991) study 
governmental measures for redistributing income from the rich to the poor. However, due to 
the inability of raising taxes, these approaches cannot be adapted to private nonprofit organi-
zations.  
A survey of the corresponding literature reveals three different patterns to implement ser-
vice quality and quantity into the objective function of private nonprofit decision makers. 
Newhouse (1970) and Rose-Ackerman (1987) follow the established convention that indiffe-
rence curves between service quality and quantity have the “usual” convex shape. Along a 
second line, Dor and Farley (1996) as well as Friesner and Rosenman (2004) argue in favor of 
2 The study pinpoints major exclusions and limitations in the coverage of micro-insurance schemes. Moreover, 
most of the schemes operate with reimbursement limitations. 
3 Food for Survival (2000) studied 971 New York soup kitchens and food pantries and found that the majority of 
offered food consists of cheap non-perishable goods (rice, pasta, beans, powdered milk, canned foods etc.) while 
the supply of fresh food is relatively rare.  
2service intensity-adjusted output, where quality (characterized by service intensity) and quan-
tity are multiplicably dependent within the nonprofit’s utility function. A third specification is 
given by Blau and Mocan (2002), who apply a Cobb-Douglas objective function in a child-
care setting. However, all approaches lack a profound motivation for the specific interaction 
of quality and quantity within the decision maker’s utility function. Specifically, the intuition 
of the assumed dependency between the marginal utility of service quality and the absolute 
level of provided quantity remains unclear. 
The present paper fills this gap by assuming that nonprofits are inequity averse in making 
their decisions. We thereby implement one of the major insights of recent experimental eco-
nomic research on social preferences obtained from distribution games.
4
 Accordingly, in our 
theoretical model we assume that the decision maker cares about the relative payoff of others 
and experiences a disutility if the consumption possibilities of an individual deviate negative-
ly from a social reference level. We show that this characterization provides a clear under-
standing of how nonprofits benefit from service quality, quantity, and the composition of re-
cipients with regard to their initial consumption endowment. Moreover, we show within our 
theoretical framework that allocations which correspond to the empirical observations men-
tioned above can be explained. We find the following patterns: Weakly inequity-averse entre-
preneurs choose to serve the least needy individuals at (maximum) social reference quality. In 
contrast, highly inequity-averse entrepreneurs provide the poorest individuals at minimum 
quality. Allocations between both extremes occur only for entrepreneurs with moderate aver-
sion.
The organization and main results of the paper are given as follows. Section 2 introduces 
a model of the entrepreneur’s allocation problem accounting for applicants with differing in-
comes and exogenously given donations. Additionally, we allow the entrepreneur to charge 
perfectly discriminated user fees, which goes in line with common nonprofit practices.
5
 Sec-
tion 3 analyzes how a variation in donations and input costs impacts the rationing behavior of 
nonprofits. We show first that an increase in donations leads to an extension of the target 
group for all entrepreneurs and additionally to an improvement of service quality for highly 
inequity-averse entrepreneurs. Second, an increase in input costs incites decision makers with 
less inequity aversion to serve even wealthier individuals at constant (social reference) quali-
4 Seminal work in this field has been done by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). 
5 Theoretical aspects of price discrimination by nonprofits are studied by Le Grand (1975) and Steinberg and 
Weisbrod (2005). A discussion of instruments enabling user-fee discrimination is given by Steinberg and Weis-
brod (1998). 
3ty. More averse entrepreneurs leave the target group unchanged but decrease service quality. 
We conclude in section 4 with a discussion of these results. 
2. The Model
We consider a continuum of individuals    Rn,n maxminN  seeking to satisfy a basic 
human need. Examples of such needs are food, shelter, clothing, health etc. Each individual 
Nn  is willing to spend a budget 	 
nb  on purchasing one unit of a need-specific good. We 
assume that individuals are ordered according to their willingness to pay, such that 
	 
 0dnndb  and 	 
 0maxnb . Different product qualities of the good are available on per-
fectly competitive markets where firms face zero profits, and the price of the good increases 
with its quality level. We distinguish individuals only by their budget and, therefore, assume 
that consumers’ preferences are identical. Moreover, their marginal utility of quality is strictly 
positive. The latter assumptions reflect the basic-human-need character of the good. Intui-
tively, for this type of goods consumer preferences are similar and relatively intensive until a 
minimum quality level is reached. For example, the minimum level for food might be given 
by a balanced periodical nutrition. Together, our specifications of consumer preferences allow 
us to treat the terms willingness to pay and payment ability equally and, thus, to differentiate 
individuals by their income, i.e. poverty level. Accordingly, the individual maxn  is the poorest 
whereas minn  represents the wealthiest individual.
Suppose a social entrepreneur is able to perfectly observe individual budgets. This as-
sumption is supported by nonprofit practices, implying that it is quite common to differentiate 
the financial situation of needy people either through income verification sheets or through 
appropriate indicators.
6
 Moreover, Steinberg and Weisbrod (2005) argue that individuals may 
be willing to reveal their payment willingness to nonprofit but not to for-profit organizations. 
The social entrepreneur compares the individual budgets with a subjective social reference 
level srb , which might be equal to her own consumption budget or might be deduced from 
6 Steinberg and Weisbrod (1998) provide a general discussion of these indicators. More specifically, FAO (2001) 
surveys and discusses the application of indicators of several nutrition programs in developing countries (e.g. 
socio-economic status, education level, age, household size, number of children etc.). Although such practices 
are supposed to cause so-called targeting costs, we simplify by ignoring them for the following reason: These 
costs mainly arise due to the identification of suitable income indicators and the screening of individuals. How-
ever, since the social entrepreneur must screen all applicants to detect the targeted individuals, targeting costs are 
independent of the quantity and composition of recipients. Hence, they are fixed costs that simply reduce the 
amount of donations. A variation in donations is analyzed in section 3. 
4scientific or regulatory guidelines.
7
 This reference level determines the individuals the entre-
preneur considers needy. For reasons of simplicity, we assume that all n  individuals own a 
budget endowment equal or below this level, i.e. 	 
minsr nbb  . Consequently, the social en-
trepreneur observes a budgetary inequity of 	 
 	 
 0:  nbbnq srea  for the nth individual, 
which will be referred to in the following as ex-ante inequity.
In order to mitigate the ex-ante inequity the nonprofit entrepreneur offers one unit of a 
need-specific social good to any preselected individual. This selection is based on two related 
decisions: Which product quality should be offered and which needy subgroup should be tar-
geted? We make three assumptions about the quality of the social good. First, the good is pro-
vided to all recipients at uniform quality, i.e. we do not consider quality discrimination. 
Second, the marginal costs of producing an additional unit of the social good  Rc  are inde-
pendent of the supplied quantity but positively correlated to the product’s quality level.
8
 In the 
following, we do not distinguish between quality and marginal production costs and denote 
quality equivalently by c . Third, for reasons of simplicity, it is assumed that the quality of the 
social good is produced with the same technology as the market good.  
In order to illustrate the setting we have in mind, consider the following application to 
food-consumption. Here, the good is viewed as a bundle of staple foods of specific quantity 
and quality. Any change in the composition of the bundle that increases need satisfaction is 
modeled as an increase in the good’s quality. Hence, an increase in the number and scope of 
meals through additional food as well as an increase in the quality of a single item enhances 
the overall quality.
The second decision of the social entrepreneur concerns the composition and size of the 
target group. As will be argued by the following assumptions, this decision solely requires the 
choice of the marginally poorest recipient Nn . First, we define  
n,nn min  as the margi-
nally wealthiest recipient and we assume that the group of served individuals lies in the closed 
interval  n,n , with the quantity of recipients given by nn  . Furthermore, we allow the en-
trepreneur to perfectly discriminate prices. The differentiation of user fees according to pay-
ment ability, which is often observed in practice, is a basic assumption in models of nonprofit 
7 Exemplarily, the UK government (School Food Trust 2007) defined a minimum quality for school food by 
pinpointing items that have to be offered within a specific period. 
8 A different approach is taken by Rose-Ackerman (1987), who argues that the marginal costs of quality for the 
provision of social goods are zero. Although sharing the opinion that there exist some factors improving quality 
without additional costs, e.g. changing school teaching from frontal to interactive mode, we account for the ma-
jority of dimensions where improvements in quality are costly. 
5firms.
9
 In this regard, Hansmann (1980) as well as Steinberg and Weisbrod (1998) provide 
numerous examples of nonprofit industries frequently charging sliding-scale fees for different 
users. In our model, the social entrepreneur charges the nth individual a user fee that exactly 
corresponds to the budget endowment 	 
nb . The individual purchases the social good, if its 
quality c  does not fall short of the user-fee level, i.e. 	 
nbc  , or, in other words, if its quality 
is at least as high as the affordable quality of the market good.
10
 Consequently, the entrepre-
neur’s total user-fee revenues F  are given by 
(1) 	 

n
n
dn nbF .
In addition to these revenues, the entrepreneur receives an exogenously given level of dona-
tions 	 
maxD,D 0 , with 
	 
  	 

max
min
n
n
srminmaxmax dn nbbnnD
as the maximum level at which all individuals are served at social reference quality. In line 
with the organization’s nonprofit status user-fee revenues and donations have to be spent 
completely on financing the allocation of the social good to needy individuals, i.e.
(2) 	 
nncDF  .
The nonprofit-condition (2) shows that for given levels of donations D  and individual budg-
ets 	 
nb , the entrepreneur’s choice of the good’s quality c  and the marginally poorest reci-
pient n  determines the marginally wealthiest recipient 	 
n,cnn   and, likewise, the size of 
the target group 	 
n,cnn  . These dependencies are depicted in figure 1.
Given the individual endowments 	 
nb , the social entrepreneur is confronted with the sta-
tus-quo budgetary inequity 	 
 	 
nbbnq srea  . With donations D  at hand, she decides on the 
quality level c  of the social good and determines the specific target group by choice of the 
poorest recipient n . Due to the nonprofit-condition, she completely spends donations to cover
9 Theoretical aspects of price discrimination by nonprofits are studied in Le Grand (1975) and Steinberg and 
Weisbrod (2005). 
10 Recall that firms face zero profits in perfectly competitive markets and use the identical production technology 
as nonprofit organizations. Consequently, the quality an individual purchases from the market equals the budget 
which is spent. 
6c,b
srb
maxn
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c
n
D
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Figure 1: Allocation effects of the choice of quality and target group. 
the difference between marginal costs c  and individual contributions. Starting with the poor-
est recipient the funds suffice to subsidize 	 
n,cnn   individuals. Since recipients have to pay 
a user fee equal to their payment abilities, total user-fee revenues amount to 	 
n,cF . Subse-
quent to the allocation of the social good, there remains an inequity with served individuals 
amounting to 	 
 cbcq srep : , which will be referred to as ex-post inequity in the following. 
With the choice of her allocation the entrepreneur simultaneously shows two types of ration-
ing. First, by choosing the target group she completely rations all individuals 	 
 n,n,cnn .
Second, her determination of a quality level partially rations all recipients since they do not 
receive the social reference level.  
As indicated in the introduction, we characterize the social entrepreneur as an inequity-
averse decision maker. Specifically, she draws a negative utility from a deviation of an indi-
vidual’s consumption possibilities 	 
nb  from the social reference level. By providing needy 
individuals with the social good she reduces the inequity and, hence, her own disutility. We 
thereby build on recent experimental economic research which investigates general social 
preferences by means of simple distribution games, e.g. dictator and ultimatum games, where 
one individual decides on the distribution of an exogenously given amount of money between 
herself and other players. In their seminal work Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as well as Bolton 
and Ockenfels (2000) analyze the results of several experiments and conclude that the inequi-
ty-aversion motive is able to explain the observed behavior. Exemplarily, Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999) thereby use the following definition: “Inequity aversion means that people resist                  
7inequitable outcomes; i.e., they are willing to give up some material payoff to move in the 
direction of more equitable outcomes.”  
We apply this motive to our model for two reasons. First, the analyzed distribution games 
are closely related to the decision context of the social entrepreneur in that an exogenously 
given amount of third-party funds has to be allocated between different individuals.
11
 Second, 
given that the principle of inequity aversion constitutes a building block in understanding the 
general fairness preferences of individuals, we can expect it to characterize the motivation of 
social entrepreneurs, in particular these, whose raison d’être lies in the mitigation of existing 
inequitable allocations. However, we use a broader definition of inequity aversion than Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999), who model the preferences of the distributor as self-centered inequity 
aversion, meaning that she cares about her own payoff relative to the payoff of others. In con-
trast, we do not restrict the reference outcome (in our paper: the social reference level srb ) to 
be the entrepreneurs own budget endowment but, as previously argued, also allow for alterna-
tive reference levels, e.g. societal standards.
The inequity-aversion motive is introduced into our model through the parameter  R .
It determines the social entrepreneur’s disutility from inequity by exponentially weighting 
	 
nqea  and 	 
cqep , respectively. The functional form of her disutility can be written as  
(3) 	 
 qqv  , with 	 
 	 
 cq,nqq epea .
The parameter   thereby determines the level of the constant elasticity of marginal disutility 
1  and is likewise a measure for the curvature of value function (3).12 Additionally, as 
with the class of Cobb-Douglas utility functions,   characterizes the entrepreneur’s intensity 
of disutility. Marginal disutility is decreasing with 	 
10  , , constant with 1 , and in-
creasing with 	 
 ,1 .13 More specifically, an entrepreneur with 0  does not care about 
differences in budgetary inequity between individuals and values 	 
nqea  and 	 
cqep  identical-
ly. In contrast, for any positive   the entrepreneur draws an increased disutility from individ-
                                                
11 Although we do not account for efficiency concerns in our model, the distribution game closest to our model 
specification is analyzed as treatment R in Engelmann and Strobel (2004). Here, the decision maker is the weal-
thiest individual and is likewise not able to extract any rents for herself.  
12 The elasticity of marginal disutility is defined as 	 
  	 
 qvqdqqvd  .
13 With these specifications of marginal disutility we broaden the scope of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), who inte-
grate   multiplicatively into the utility function and, hence, restrict their analysis to linear inequity aversion, i.e. 
constant marginal disutility. However, they also observe “a nonnegligible fraction of people who exhibit nonli-
near inequality aversion” in dictator experiments (p. 823). 
8(6)
uals being subject to higher inequity. This increase in disutility is the larger the higher the 
value of   is, and it becomes infinite with  .14 As will be shown later, entrepreneurs 
with extreme inequity aversion care only for the poorest target group individuals.
Based on the introduced disutility concept, we now characterize the social entrepreneur’s 
utility from allocating one unit of the social good to a target group individual by the following 
functional form:  
(4) 	 
 	 
	 
 	 
	 
 	 
  	 
 cbnbbcqvnqvn,cu srsrepea  .
Her utility equals the difference between the weighted ex-ante and ex-post inequity, i.e. the 
reduction of disutility through provision of the social good. As intuitive result, a non-inequity-
averse entrepreneur 	 
0  receives no utility from allocating the good independent of the 
type of recipient. Hence, she does not engage in the social-good provision.
As previously argued, by simultaneously choosing the quality level c  of the social good 
and the poorest recipient n , the entrepreneur, due to nonprofit condition (2), indirectly deter-
mines the wealthiest recipient 	 
n,cn  and, hence, also the quantity of served individuals, 
	 
n,cnn  . Aggregating the utility values of equation (4) for each recipient then yields the 
following total utility level: 
(5) 	 
	 
 	 
  	 
 
	 

dncbnbbn,cn,n,cU
n
n,cn
srsr   .
For reasons of tractability, the notation of utility function (5) includes the entrepreneur’s deci-
sion variables c  and n  as well as their influence on the value of the wealthiest recipient 
	 
n,cn . We thereby allow for a precise characterization of the entrepreneur’s scope of alterna-
tives: Under consideration of nonprofit-condition (2), the entrepreneur can (directly or indi-
rectly) vary two of the variables with the third kept constant. The maximization problem of 
the entrepreneur is given by
	 
	 
n,cn,n,cU  max
n,c
	 
  0   s.t.   dn nbcD
n
n
.
15
                                                
14 Note that the case   corresponds to maximin-preferences.  
9In the following, we prove the existence of corner and interior solutions to maximization 
problem (6).
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Proposition 1: Weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs 	 
(0,1)  choose the maximum quali-
ty 	 
srbc   and provide only the wealthiest individuals 	 
minnn,cn  )( . On the other hand, 
highly inequity-averse entrepreneurs 	 
)1(  ,  serve only the poorest applicants 
	 
maxnn   at the lowest feasible quality 	 
))(( maxn,cnbc   . Finally, interior optima 
	 srbc   and 
maxnn   only exist if 1 .
Proof: See Appendix. 
If donations are insufficient to serve all needy individuals, the social entrepreneur chooses 
the mix of quality and recipients that maximizes her utility from reduced inequity under the 
fulfillment of nonprofit-condition (2). As proposition 1 shows, a first maximum is given for 
weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs 	 
(0,1) . Their marginal utility of serving the next 
poorer recipient is always lower than both their marginal utility of an improvement in quality 
(given a constant wealthiest recipient) and their marginal utility of serving the next wealthier 
recipient (given a constant quality). Consequently, the entrepreneur maximizes the social-
good quality 	 
srbc   and serves only the wealthiest recipients 	 
minnn,cn  )( . Intuitive-
ly, weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs show the highest marginal disutility of inequity for 
marginal deviations of individual budgets from the social reference level. As immediate con-
sequence, the first unit of donations (in form of the social good) is used to completely elimi-
nate the inequity of the wealthiest needy individual 	 
minnn   which requires the entrepre-
neur to choose the maximum quality for the good. Until the entire donations are spent, indi-
viduals are successively supplied according to the next higher inequity. The characterized 
corner solution is depicted in figure 2, panel (a). 
                                                                                                                                                        
15 Employing equation (1) into nonprofit-condition (2) and rearranging it with respect to D  yields 
	 
  
n
n
dnnbcD .
16 Utility function (5) is similar to the normative poverty measure put forward by Foster et al. (1984). Applying 
this measure Bourguignon and Fields (1990) analyze optimal governmental subsidies to individuals. Their find-
ings resemble the results of proposition 1. 
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c,b
srbc 
	 
nb
n
D
	 
 n,cF
	 
 minnn,cn  n
c,b
srb
	 
nb
c
n
D
	 
 n,cF
	 
 n,cn n
c,b
srb
maxnn 

	 
nb
c
D
	 
 n,cF
	 
 n,cn n
(a)                                                 (b)                                                   (c) 
Figure 2: Corner allocations and an arbitrary interior solution. 
Second, interior optima 	 srbc   and 
maxnn   exist for moderately inequity-averse en-
trepreneurs 	 
1 . Their marginal utility of a change in each of the three variables is equally 
large, which allows for any values that satisfy nonprofit-condition (2). Entrepreneurs in this 
category show a constant marginal disutility of inequity and, thus, do not care for which ap-
plicants and to what level inequity is reduced. An arbitrary interior solution is characterized in 
figure 2, panel (b). Throughout the rest of the paper the case of 1  will no longer be ana-
lyzed. Independent of the subsequently considered parameter variations it can be shown that 
the marginal utilities of quality, the wealthiest and the poorest recipient remain equally large. 
Consequently, any allocation satisfying nonprofit-condition (2) is optimal and, therefore, 
1  has no further explanatory value. 
Third, the marginal utility of highly inequity-averse entrepreneurs 	 
)1(  ,  is lower 
for an improvement in quality than for a provision of both the next poorer and the next weal-
thier recipient. The resulting allocation is depicted in figure 2, panel (c). Here, only the poor-
est recipients 	 
maxnn   are served at the minimum quality 	 
))((   n,cnbc .17 The intui-
tion runs contrary to that of panel (a). Since the marginal disutility from inequity is largest for 
the highest inequity level, utility is maximized, if donations are transferred to the poorest in-
dividuals 	 
)(  n,cnnmax , such that the ex-post inequity is equal across recipients but high-
est across all needy individuals. This procedure determines the low quality level of the social 
good.
                                                
17 Interestingly, this is also the optimal allocation under maximin-preferences. 
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In addition to these findings, figure 1 (panel (c)) indicates that highly inequity-averse en-
trepreneurs choose to serve the largest quantity of needy individuals 	 
	 
  n,cnn . Howev-
er, this result only holds if the function of budget endowments 	 
nb  is convex. More specifi-
cally, differences in the chosen target-group quantity depend on both the social entrepreneurs’ 
inequity aversion and the curvature of the 	 
nb -function, as we show formally with the fol-
lowing proposition.
Proposition 2: Highly inequity-averse entrepreneurs 	 
	 
 ,1  serve the maximum quantity 
of individuals 	 
  n,cnn , if the 	 
nb -curve is convex. In contrast, if 	 
nb  is concave, then 
the quantity of recipients is largest for weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs ))10((  ,  .
However, both types of entrepreneurs choose the same and likewise maximum quantity of 
recipients if 	 
nb  is a linear function.
Proof: See Appendix. 
Intuitively, the maximum quantity of individuals is served if the required average subsidy 
margin, i.e. the average difference between constant marginal production costs c  and the per-
fectly discriminated user fee 	 
nb , is lowest. There are two requirements to a minimal aver-
age subsidy. First, since marginal production costs are assumed to be equal across individuals, 
and 	 
nb  is a decreasing function in n , any target group is served with the lowest possible 
amount of donations, if the wealthiest recipient receives no subsidy. Otherwise, any positive 
subsidy to this individual would have to be likewise granted to each other recipient, implying 
increased spending of donations. Second, a minimum average subsidy margin arises among 
those recipients whose budgets are most uniformly distributed. For those individuals the gap 
between costs and user fee 	 
nbc   is smallest on average.  
Following proposition 1, the first requirement is met for all entrepreneurs with 
	 
 ,0 \ 1 . However, the fulfillment of the second requirement depends on the curvature 
of the function of budget endowments 	 
nb . Given that 	 
nb  is convex, individual budgets 
vary least among the poorest individuals, such that highly inequity-averse entrepreneurs 
	 
)1(  ,  serve the maximum quantity of recipients. In contrast, given a concave 	 
nb -
function, budgets are most uniformly distributed among the wealthiest individuals which are 
supplied by weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs 	 
)10( , . Consequently, they serve the 
maximum quantity of recipients. Finally, there exist no such differences in the distribution of 
12
individual budgets, if the 	 
nb -curve is linear, which implies an equal and maximum target-
group quantity for all entrepreneurs with 	 
 ,0 \ 1 .
3. Variations in Donations and Input Costs 
As argued in section 2, the determinants of the social entrepreneur’s allocation decision 
include available third-party funds and production costs. These financial conditions are likely 
to change during the lifetime of a social business. A donor might withdraw or extend an-
nounced funds or might simply terminate a long-term relationship. Input costs might vary due 
to periodic shortages or shocks on resource markets. In this section, we analyze the impact of 
those variations on the entrepreneur’s choice of target group and social-good quality.
In principle, the social entrepreneur can alternatively use additional donations to serve 
more or different individuals, or to improve the quality of the social good. The next proposi-
tion shows that, on the one hand, entrepreneurs react differently on variations in donations 
but, on the other hand, the classification of corner and interior solutions by level of inequity 
aversion remains unaffected.
18
Proposition 3: Given an increase in donations, entrepreneurs with 	 
 ,0 \ 1  enlarge the 
quantity of served individuals 	 
 	 
	 
  n,cnnn,cnn DDD . In particular, weakly ineq-
uity-averse entrepreneurs 	 
	 
10,  keep serving the wealthiest individuals 
	 
 	 
	 
minDD nn,cnn,cn    at the social reference level 	 
srD bcc    and expand their 
target group toward the next poorer individuals 	 
  nn D . In contrast, highly inequity-
averse entrepreneurs 	 
)1(  ,  still focus on the most needy individuals 	 
maxD nnn   ,
improve the social-good quality 	 
  ccD  and serve the next wealthier applicants 
	 
 	 
	 
  n,cnn,cn DD .
Proof: See Appendix. 
Intuitively, an increase in donations does not affect the entrepreneur’s marginal disutility 
of ex-ante inequity as obtained from equation (3). Hence, there is no effect on her decision on 
how to reduce this inequity optimally, i.e. the order of her marginal utilities of quality c ,
                                                
18 In the following the entrepreneur’s decision variables are superscripted by D  to account for the state of in-
creased donations.  
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marginally poorest recipient n , and marginally wealthiest beneficiary 	 
n,cn  remains un-
changed. Consequently, entrepreneurs with 	 
10,  still have the highest marginal disutility 
for the lowest levels of inequity which incites them to serve the wealthiest individuals 
	 
 	 
	 
minDD nn,cnn,cn    at social reference quality 	 
srD bcc   . These recipients 
now comprise the ex-ante target group and, additionally, the next poorer applicants 
	 
  nn D . Entrepreneurs with 	 
 ,1 , on the other hand, eliminate the maximum disutili-
ty of inequity, if they keep on serving the poorest individuals 	 
maxD nnn    at minimum 
quality. Additional donations are spent on serving the next wealthier applicants. However, 
these individuals are only willing to purchase the social good, if its quality is at least equal to 
their budget endowment. Hence, the entrepreneur, likewise, improves quality unless the weal-
thiest recipient is indifferent between the market and the social good 	 
	 
	 
  DDD n,cnbc .
Consequently, the model predicts an increase in both the quantity of recipients and the social-
good quality as reaction to an increase in third-party funds. 
As a second variation, consider a general increase in input costs (in the following indexed 
by superscript I ). Note that in section 2 we assumed perfectly competitive for-profit markets 
and identical quality-production technologies of for- and nonprofit firms. These assumptions 
imply that, for a constant quality, the increase in input costs equally increases the price of the 
market good. Additionally, it still holds that any individual owning a budget equal or below 
the quality level Ic  applies for the social good and individuals with 	 
 Icnb   demand the 
market good. The increase in input costs is reflected by a change of two parameters. First, the 
social reference budget increases 	 
srIsr bb   because higher expenditures are required to pur-
chase the corresponding consumption quality. Second, we assume that the total quantity of 
needy individuals enlarges by those people who are no longer able to afford the social refer-
ence consumption. As a result, the set of needy individuals is now characterized by 
   Rn,n maxIminIN  with minImin nn   and 	 
IminIsr nbb  .
Given that the social entrepreneur does not change marginal production costs 	 
ccI  ,
she is restricted to use qualitatively lower or less inputs per unit of the social good, which 
deteriorates its quality.  Alternatively, she could increase Ic  to keep the quality constant, but 
this, according to nonprofit-condition (2), would imply a decrease in the quantity of served 
individuals. As proposition 4 shows, an increase in input costs leads to contrary reactions of 
social entrepreneurs depending on their level of inequity aversion.
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Proposition 4: For weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs 	 
	 
10,  an increase in input costs 
leads to a provision of wealthier individuals 	 
	 
IminII nn,cn   at (unchanged) social refer-
ence quality 	 
IsrI bc  . In contrast, highly inequity-averse entrepreneurs 	 
	 
 ,1  keep 
serving the status-quo target group 	 
 	 
	 
  n,cnn,cn    nnn IImaxI and  at constant 
marginal costs 	 
	 
	 
maxI n,cnbcc   , i.e. lower quality.  
Proof: See Appendix. 
Weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs 	 
	 
10,  show the highest marginal disutility of 
ex-ante inequity for marginal deviations of individual budgets 	 
nb  from the social reference 
level. An increased budget Isrb  required to consume the social-reference quality and a simul-
taneously enlarged quantity of needy individuals 	 
minmaxIminmax nnnn  , thus, renders the 
initial choices of marginal costs 	 
srbc   and target group 	 
	 
minsr nn,bn   suboptimal. The 
entrepreneur reacts by increasing marginal costs to Isrb  and shifting the target group toward 
the ‘new’ wealthiest applicants 	 
	 
IminIIsr nn,bn  . This way, she eliminates the fraction of 
inequity with the highest disutility. As figure 3 indicates, a complete shift in the target group 
occurs, if Isrb  is such that donations are insufficient to allocate the good to more than the 
“new” applicants at social reference quality, i.e.  
	 
  
min
I
min
n
n
I
sr dnnbbD .
No initially served individual is further considered by the entrepreneur.  
In contrast, the marginal disutility of highly inequity-averse entrepreneurs 	 
	 
 ,1  in-
creases with the inequity level. As shown in section 2, they choose to serve the poorest indi-
viduals 	 
maxnn   at minimum quality 	 
	 
	 
maxn,cnbc   . Since an increase in input costs 
exerts no effect on the relative poverty of individuals, i.e. the individuals within the set 
	 
 maxmax n,n,cn   are still poorest, the entrepreneur neither changes the target group 
	 
 	 
	 
  n,cnn,cn    nnn IImaxI and  nor the marginal production costs 
	 
	 
	 
maxI n,cnbcc   . However, quality necessarily drops due to increased input costs. 
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c,b
	 
nb
D
n nIn minn
I
minn
I
sr
I bc 
srbc  D
Figure 3: A complete shift of the target group as a weakly inequity-averse reaction on an increase in input costs. 
Additionally, figure 3 indicates that a weakly inequity-averse social entrepreneur not only 
changes the composition of recipients but also their quantity. The next proposition shows that 
this change unambiguously depends on the curvature of the budget function 	 
nb .
Proposition 5: Given a concave (convex) function of budget endowments 	 
nb , weakly ineq-
uity-averse entrepreneurs 	 
)10( ,  increase (decrease) the quantity of served individuals, 
i.e. 	 
 	 
  n,cnnn,cnn III 	 
 	 
	 
 n,cnnn,cnn III   , as a reaction to an 
increase in input costs. Given a linear budget function, they do not change the quantity of re-
cipients.  
Proof: See Appendix. 
From proposition 2, we know that the quantity of recipients is negatively correlated with 
the average subsidy margin required to serve the targeted individuals. Since the wealthiest 
recipient receives no subsidy independent of the input costs, this margin is only conditional on 
the distribution of individual budget endowments, i.e. the curvature of the 	 
nb -function. The 
average subsidy is thereby the smaller the more uniformly budgets are distributed. Given that 
	 
nb  is concave, the dispersion is lowest among the highest budgets. Consequently, the target 
group is larger after input costs increased, because recipients are wealthier on average. How-
ever, the ex-post quantity is smaller if 	 
nb  is convex, which is exemplarily depicted in figure 
3. Here, individual budgets are least uniformly distributed among the wealthiest applicants. 
Finally, due to the same reasoning, no differences occur if 	 
nb  is linear. 
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4. Conclusion 
Our objective in this paper was to develop a positive model of a nonprofit entrepreneur’s 
allocation decision, which includes the selection of the target group and the quality of the so-
cial good, in the light of limited third-party funds. By assuming that a social entrepreneur`s 
decision is characterized by inequity aversion, we follow recent results of experimental eco-
nomic research on social preferences. We demonstrate how this preference assumption con-
veys a better understanding of how the good’s quality, the quantity of recipients as well as 
their income distribution interact within the objective function of private nonprofit decision 
makers. Specifically, an improvement of service quality increases the consumption level of 
beneficiaries and, hence, reduces inequity. In contrast, an enlargement of the target group re-
duces the inequity for additional recipients. In both cases the entrepreneur benefits through a 
reduction of her disutility from inequity. Finally, the composition of recipients enters the deci-
sion calculus through the marginal disutility of inequity. With increasing (decreasing) mar-
ginal disutility the entrepreneur prefers to reduce a given amount of inequity of a poorer 
(wealthier) individual.
We find that weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs choose to provide wealthier individu-
als at high social reference quality. In contrast, highly inequity-averse entrepreneurs care for 
the poorest individuals but offer minimum quality. These results allow for two explanations of 
the low quality of services to the very poor. First, the goods or services considered in these 
studies were provided by highly inequity-averse entrepreneurs and/or, second, they were sup-
plied by weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs applying a low subjective reference quality. 
Whether social entrepreneurs apply subjective reference levels or rather a societally standar-
dized norm remains an empirical question.
As a further result, we show that the quantity of supplied individuals depends on the cur-
vature of the budget function. Given convexity (concavity), highly (weakly) inequity-averse 
entrepreneurs serve the maximum number of needy people. Moreover, we find that entrepre-
neurs react differently with regard to variations in donations and input costs. Irrespective of 
the considered variation, entrepreneurs with low aversion never change the quality of the so-
cial good. In contrast, entrepreneurs with high aversion improve quality if additional funds are 
available, and they lower quality when inputs used for production become more expensive. 
Common to both types of decision makers is the provision of more individuals if donations 
increase. However, given a sufficiently high increase in input costs, highly inequity-averse 
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entrepreneurs do not change the target group while weakly inequity-averse entrepreneurs 
serve a completely different (viz. wealthier) group.  
Our results yield implications for stakeholders of nonprofit organizations whose objec-
tives are related to quality, quantity and the composition of recipients. More specifically, do-
nors or governments aiming at maximizing the number of served individuals with given funds 
should fund entrepreneurs who focus on the poorest people, if the majority of needy individu-
als is relatively poor (suggesting a convex budget-function in the model). In contrast, stake-
holders generally interested in minimizing the number of needy individuals, through a provi-
sion of maximum service quality, should support entrepreneurs serving less poor individuals. 
Those stakeholders do not even need to change their contribution if input costs increase. 
Finally, the framework developed in this paper constitutes a basis for analyzing additional 
issues of social entrepreneurial behavior. Specifically, it merits further investigation of how 
the different allocation patterns change if stakeholders exert an influence on the social entre-
preneur’s decision. Especially, so-called lead donors, typically granting a significant and often 
the largest part of the initial financial need of nonprofit organizations, might wish to regulate 
if the entrepreneurial behaviour inadequately reflects their own objectives. 
Appendix: Proof of Propositions 1-5
Proof of Proposition 1: For notational clarity, we temporarily expand the term 	 
	 
n,cn,n,cU
to 	 
	 
;n,cn,n,cU  to emphasize the influence of the entrepreneur’s inequity aversion. How-
ever, we simplify the explicit notation by use of U .
By inserting user-fee revenues (1) into nonprofit-condition (2) and applying the implicit 
function theorem, one obtains the partial dependencies 	 
  	 
  0 nbcn,cnndcnd ,
	 
 	 
  	 
	 
  0 n,cnbcn,cnndcn,cnd  and 	 
 	 
  	 
	 
  1 n,cnbcnbcndn,cnd .
Given that 	 
n,cn  is constant, the social entrepreneur increases c  at the cost of n , or vice 
versa, if her total utility level is increased. She leaves both decision variables unchanged if the 
utility maximum is reached. Equivalent considerations apply for the pairwise variations of c
and 	 
n,cn , while keeping n  constant, as well as n  and 	 
n,cn , with c  constant.
Consider the variation of c  and n  for a constant 	 
n,cn . The corresponding condition for 
marginal utilities can be written as  
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(A1)   
dc
nd
n
U
c
U








.
Specifically, the entrepreneur increases (decreases) c  and likewise decreases (increases) n  if 
(A1) holds with > (<). Both variables are left unchanged if (A1) holds with equality. Inserting 
the partial derivatives into condition (A1) and rearranging it yields 
(A2)   
	 
  	 
	 
 	 
  	 

	 
  	 
cbnbb
cbcbnbbnbb
srsr
srsrsrsr




 1
 .
As a first result, condition (A2) holds with equality for 0  and 1 . Since any entrepre-
neur with 0  draws no utility from and, hence, does not engage in the allocation of the 
social good, an interior utility maximum is solely given for 1 . Furthermore, the right term 
of condition (A2) is convexly increasing in  . Combining the two results gives 
	 
 	 
dcndnUcU  , if 	 
10, , 	 
 	 
dcndnUcU  , if 1 , and 
  	 
dcndnUcU  , if 	 
 ,1 .
The same reasoning applies to the pairwise variation of c  and 	 
n,cn  for a constant n .
Formulating the condition on marginal utilities yields 
(A3)   
	 

	 

dc
n,cnd
n,cn
U
c
U








.
Its rearrangement gives a similar expression as shown in condition (A2): 
(A4)   
	 
	 
  	 
	 
	 
 	 
  	 

	 
	 
  	 
cbn,cnbb
cbcbn,cnbbn,cnbb
srsr
srsrsrsr




 1
 .
Again, condition (A4) holds with equality for 0  and 1  and its right term is convexly 
increasing in  . Hence, 	 
  	 
 dcn,cndn,cnUcU   if 	 
10, ,
	 
  	 
 dcn,cndn,cnUcU   if 1 , and 	 
  	 
 dcn,cndn,cnUcU   if 
	 
 ,1 .
Finally, consider the pairwise variation of n  and 	 
n,cn  for a constant c . Here, the con-
dition on marginal utilities is written as 
(A5)   
	 

	 

nd
n,cnd
n,cn
U
n
U








,
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or, equivalently,
(A6)   	 
 	 
	 
  	 

	 
	 

	 
	 
	 
 	 
 
	 
	 
n,cnbc
cbn,cnbb
n,cnbc
cbn,cnbb,x srsrsrsr











 : ,
with 	 
	 
 	 
 0:  nbn,cnb  and 
	 
 	 
	 
 
	 
	 
	 

	 
 0
2
1








  



  xˆ
n,cnbc
n,cnbb,x sr ,
with 	 
 	 
	 
  	 
	 
  	 

	 
	 

1
:





 
!






n,cnbb
cbcbn,cnbbn,cnbcxˆ
sr
sr
srsr .
For 0  and 1 , condition (A6) holds with equality and 	 
 0xˆ  and, hence, 
	 
 0  ,x . For  10," , 	 
   ,x  and 	 
  dxˆd  are indeterminate. However, 
since 	 
 022  dxˆd , it follows that 	 
 0  ,x  and, hence, 
	 
  	 
	 
ndn,cndn,cnUnU   if 	 
10, . 	 
  	 
	 
ndn,cndn,cnUnU   if 
1 . Finally, 	 
 0  ,x  and 	 
  	 
	 
ndn,cndn,cnUnU   if 	 
 ,1 .
The results of the pairwise comparisons show that, for any given  , the ordering of mar-
ginal utilities is independent of the levels of c , n , and 	 
n,cn . Hence, with exception of the 
special case 1 , the social entrepreneur directly or indirectly chooses the maximum levels 
of those two variables that show the highest marginal utility. Thus, combining the previous 
results, one obtains 
dc
nd
n
U
c
U






 and 
	 

	 

nd
n,cnd
n,cn
U
n
U






 if 	 
10, ,
	 

	 

dc
n,cnd
n,cn
U
dc
nd
n
U
c
U









 if 1 , and 
	 

	 

nd
n,cnd
n,cn
U
n
U






 and 
	 

	 

dc
n,cnd
n,cn
U
c
U






 if 	 
 ,1 .
Consequently, srbc 
  and 	 
 minnn,cn   if 	 
10, , c  and n  can adopt any values that 
satisfy nonprofit-condition (2) if 1 , and 	 
	 
  n,cnbc  and maxnn   if 	 
 ,1 .
Q.e.d.
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Proof of Proposition 2: Let l  index the optimal choices for 	 
10,  and h  for 	 
 ,1 .
The maximum quantity of recipients is given if the average subsidy margin to served individ-
uals, 	 

	 

	 
 n,cnndnnbc
n
n,cn
  , is minimal. Since 	 
 0dnndb  and c  is constant for all 
	 
  n,n,cnn , a minimum average margin implies non-subsidization of the marginally 
wealthiest recipient, i.e.  
(A7)   	 
	 
 0  n,cnbc ,
which is, following the proof of proposition 1, fulfilled for 1" . Furthermore, for any two 
pairs ic ,

in  and 

jc ,

jn  fulfilling (A7) and with 
  ji cc  and for all 	 
	  jjmax n,cnn,0# ,
it holds that
(A8)   	 
	 
 	 
	 
## 



  jjjiii n,cnbc  n,cnbc    if 	 
 022



dnnbd .
Consequently, if 	 
 022 dnnbd , then the average individual subsidy margin is minimal for 
the choices hc  and 	 
maxh nn   which implies the maximum quantity of served individuals 
	 
maxhmax n,cnn  . In contrast, if 	 
 022 dnnbd  then the choices 	 
srl bc   and ln  imply the 
maximum quantity of recipients 	 
  lsrl n,bnn . Finally, if 	 
 022 dnnbd , then we have 
	 
 	 
  lsrlmaxhmax n,bnnn,cnn . Q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 3: From the proof of proposition 1, the order of the marginal utilities of 
c , n , and 	 
n,cn , as given in (A2), (A4), and (A6), is uniquely determined by  , and conse-
quently independent of D . Thus, for 	 
10,  an increase in D  leads to srD bcc    and 
	 
 	 
 minDD nn,cnn,cn   . Given these values, nonprofit-condition (2) is fulfilled if 
  nn D  which implies 	 
 	 
  n,cnnn,cnn DDD . In contrast, for 	 
 ,1  the en-
trepreneur chooses max
D nnn    and 	 
	 
  DDD n,cnbc  which implies   ccD  and 
	 
 	 
  n,cnn,cn DD  and, hence, 	 
 	 
  n,cnnn,cnn DDD . Q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 4: In the proof of proposition 1 we showed that the order of the marginal 
utilities of c , n , and 	 
n,cn , as given in equations (A2), (A4), and (A6), is uniquely deter-
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mined by  , and hence independent of srb . Thus, for 	 
10,  an increase in input costs, i.e. 
an increase in srb , leads to 
I
sr
I bc   and 	 
 IminII nn,cn  . In contrast, for 	 
 ,1  we ob-
tain max
I nn   and   ccI , which implies a decrease in social-good quality. Q.e.d.
Proof of Proposition 5: The proof of proposition 2 shows that the quantity of recipients is 
negatively correlated to the average subsidy margin 	 

	 

	 
 n,cnndnnbc
n
n,cn
   to served 
individuals. Since, according to proposition 4, condition (A7) is still fulfilled after input costs 
rise, i.e. 	 
	 
 0  III n,cnbc , differences in the average subsidy margin between the two 
states are uniquely determined by the sign of 	 
 22 dnnbd . With   Ii cc ,   Ii nn ,   cc j ,
and   nn j  and, hence, 	 
	  n,cnn, max0# , it follows by condition (A8) that if 
	 
 022 dnnbd  then the average individual subsidy margin is smaller for the choices Ic  and 
In  which implies 	 
 	 
  n,cnnn,cnn III . In contrast, if 	 
 022 dnnbd  then 
	 
 	 
  n,cnnn,cnn III . Finally, if 	 
 022 dnnbd  then we have 
	 
 	 
  n,cnnn,cnn III . Q.e.d.
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